Summary of Key Points
The national number of marriage registrations continues to decline, yet many people still get married around the Qixi Festival. This seemingly contradictory phenomenon reflects a unique shift in China's marriage and childbearing patterns: Marriage remains the mainstream form for establishing stable relationships and having children (the "boundaries" remain stable), but the timing of marriage and childbearing is rapidly reorganizing—people are getting married later and having fewer children, yet the period within which they have children after marriage is becoming shorter (an internal reorganization). At the same time, there is a mismatch between changes in attitudes and behaviors: Attitudes related to personal choices (such as cohabitation and acceptance of divorce) are changing before practical constraints (such as late marriage and fewer children) take effect. If current real-world pressures (such as housing costs and childcare expenses) do not ease, China may follow the path of countries like Japan and South Korea, where an increasing number of people choose not to marry or have children.
I. Marriage Is Still a "Serious Matter," While Cohabitation Is More of a Pre-Marital "Trial"
Many believe that young people do not want to get married and prefer cohabitation, but the data shows:
- 30.4% of those born in the 1980s have experienced cohabitation, yet less than 5% of young people today are in stable cohabitations—cohabitation is more like a trial period before marriage, not a substitute for it.
- Although the divorce rate has increased, the proportion of divorces within 10 years of marriage has only risen by 3 percentage points among those born in the 1960s to 2000s, which is much lower than in Europe and America.
- The proportion of out-of-wedlock births is only 3.9%, similar to that in Japan and South Korea (2.3% and 3.4% respectively), compared to 30%-40% in the United States and 72.9% in Mexico.
Conclusion: Marriage remains the primary means for Chinese people to establish stable relationships and have children; the traditional boundaries of marriage and childbearing have not yet loosened.
II. Getting Married Later, but Having Children Quickly After Marriage
This is not simply about "late marriage and late childbearing"; rather, it's about a misalignment in timing:
- Later marriages: In 2020, the average age at first marriage was 29.4 years for men and 28 years for women, up from 3.6 years and 4 years respectively in 2010.
- Rapid childbearing after marriage: The median time between marriage and the birth of the first child for women born in the 1980s was only 0.9 years, much shorter than before.
- Shorter childbearing span: Although the age at first childbirth has increased, the age at which childbearing ends has not increased accordingly, resulting in a shorter period between the first and last child.
Reason: It's not about "getting pregnant before getting married" (which is still the mainstream in China); rather, people are eager to have children after marriage—almost like completing a task.
III. A Small Number Choose To Never Marry or Have Children, but Young People's Trends Are Worth Watching
For now, most people will eventually marry and have children:
- In 2020, only 2.1% of women aged 40-44 were unmarried, and the proportion of those who will never have children was less than 3%, far lower than in Japan and South Korea (nearly 20% for women in their 40s in Japan and 15% in South Korea).
- However, it's important to note that these figures reflect the "older generation" (such as those born in the 1970s and early 1980s). The marriage and childbearing patterns of younger generations (born in the 1990s and 2000s) are still developing, and their willingness to avoid marriage and children is on the rise; these proportions may increase in the future.
IV. Mismatch Between Attitudes and Behaviors: Some Have Changed Their Minds, While Others Are Forced
The pace of change in attitudes and behaviors varies:
- Attitudes changing first: Acceptance of cohabitation and divorce has increased—35% of men and 30% of women born in the 1990s believe that it's okay to cohabit without getting married, and more people no longer agree that marriage is essential. However, the actual divorce rate has not increased significantly.
- Behaviors changing first: Late marriage and fewer children are driven by practical constraints—young people's ideal marriage age has not risen in line with their desires, and they want to have more children (e.g., 2) than they actually do (around 1.6), indicating that housing pressures, childcare costs, and busy work schedules prevent them from getting married earlier or having more children.
V. China's Path of Marriage and Childbearing Is Different from Europe, America, and Japan/South Korea
Internationally, there are three main patterns of change in marriage and childbearing:
- Europe and America: Marriage is being replaced by cohabitation; out-of-wedlock births are common, and the proportion of people who never marry or have children is high, with a stable trend.
- Japan and South Korea: The concept of marriage and childbearing is declining—cohabitation and out-of-wedlock births are rare, but the number of people choosing not to marry or have children is increasing rapidly.
- China: The boundaries of marriage remain stable, but there are internal changes: Marriage is still mainstream, but people get married later, have fewer children, and have them quickly after marriage.
Future risks: If policies related to employment, housing, and childcare support do not keep up, China may follow the path of Japan and South Korea, with more people choosing not to marry or have children.
Conclusion
The changes in China's marriage and childbearing patterns are not about a general lack of desire for marriage; rather, they reflect shifts in how people choose to get married and have children. To understand these changes, it is important to look beyond the annual numbers of marriages and births and consider the contradictions between timing, attitudes, and reality. Policies need to address these issues proactively, such as reducing childcare costs and providing housing support, to prevent young people from moving from "late marriage" to "no marriage" or from "fewer children" to "no children."