Summary of Key Points
The Mumbai-Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail project is a flagship initiative of cooperation between India and Japan. To date, 453 kilometers out of a total of 508 kilometers have been completed. The first 100-kilometer section is expected to open in August 2027, with the entire line scheduled to be operational by 2029. This will reduce travel time between the two cities from 6 to 7 hours to around 2 hours. However, the Japanese Shinkansen trains and signaling systems that were originally planned to be used have been replaced by Indian-made B28 trains and German Siemens signaling systems. Japan, which invested heavily in the project, has not secured the core contracts, effectively “making clothes for others.” The decision to switch systems reflects differences in cost and technical standards, as well as India’s political preference for “local manufacturing.”
1. What benefits does this high-speed rail project have for ordinary Indians?
For the general public, the main advantages are time savings and cost-effectiveness. Currently, a regular air-conditioned train from Mumbai to Ahmedabad takes 6 to 7 hours, while the high-speed rail only takes 2 hours—faster even than flying, considering the time spent traveling to and from the airport. The ticket price starts at 3,000 rupees (about 211 Chinese yuan), which is cheaper than airplane tickets (around 300 to 500 rupees) but slightly more expensive than regular air-conditioned trains (100 to 150 rupees per ticket). It represents a fast, affordable option for those with moderate incomes.
Additionally, this high-speed rail uses a different track gauge (1,435 mm) than India’s traditional broad gauge (1,676 mm), ensuring that it does not compete with regular trains for tracks and maintaining high speeds. Once the entire line is operational, it will facilitate more efficient transportation of people and goods between Mumbai (India’s financial center) and Ahmedabad (the capital of Gujarat state and Modi’s hometown), potentially boosting the economy along the route.
2. How did Japan-India cooperation turn from a “honeymoon” to a “breakup”?
Japan was initially the main financier and technology provider, offering low-interest loans and planning to transfer the entire Shinkansen technology package (including E5/E10 series trains and DS-ATC signaling system). However, India changed its mind due to two main issues:
1. Disagreements over train prices: Only two Japanese manufacturers produce the E5 series, and their prices were deemed too high by India.
2. Incompatibility of the signaling system: The Japanese DS-ATC system is proprietary and cannot be used with other trains, failing to meet India’s requirements for “international standards and third-party certification.” India later revised the tender to use the European ETCS-L2 standard, and German Siemens won the contract for one-third of the original Japanese bid, effectively excluding Japan.
India also played a strategic move: it initially tendered for the signaling system under the pretext of testing local trains, giving Japan hope, only to reveal that it was out of the running once the results were announced, as the European standard meant the Japanese trains would not be compatible.
3. Are India’s “local high-speed trains” truly made in India?
India claims that its B28 trains are domestically produced, but in reality:
- Most components are imported: Braking systems, doors, and air conditioning systems come from German companies like Knorr. The bogies (the framework holding the train wheels) were initially intended to be developed locally but were likely purchased from Europe due to time constraints. The traction control system supplier, Medha, is an Indian company with Japanese and European technical expertise.
- Technical limitations: The B28 trains use stainless steel car bodies (while the Japanese E5 series uses aluminum alloy), making them about three times heavier. As a result, each B28 car is about 10 tons heavier than an E5 car, and the maximum speed is only 280 kilometers per hour (compared to the Japanese Shinkansen’s 350 kilometers per hour).
- Progress concerns: BEML, the company responsible for manufacturing, has no prior experience with high-speed rails. Although it plans to roll out the first train by early 2027, industry experts doubt that production and testing can be completed within a year, as high-speed rail requires comprehensive system debugging.
4. What has Japan lost in this project?
Japan has not only failed to secure the contracts for the trains and signaling systems but has also suffered long-term losses:
1. Direct financial losses: The investment in manpower and resources (such as building maintenance stations and designing according to Japanese standards) has been wasted, and the low-interest loans may not generate the expected returns.
2. Loss of standard-setting power: By adopting the European ETCS-L2 standard, India will use it for future high-speed rail projects, making it difficult for Japanese Shinkansen technology to enter the Indian market.
3. Political embarrassment: Highsmith Haruko’s visit to India to try to secure the train contracts was met with indifference by Modi. The joint statement’s promises to use Japanese signaling and introduce E10 trains proved to be empty, questioning Japan’s negotiating capabilities.
Japan’s lessons are clear: its technology (the Shinkansen system) is too proprietary and not compatible with international standards, and it failed to leverage its loan leverage effectively (given India’s reliance on Japanese yen loans and Japan’s reluctance to escalate diplomatic tensions).
5. The political motives behind Modi’s decision to use local trains
Modi’s motivations are clear: political display outweighs practical needs:
- Political gain for his hometown: The high-speed rail passes through Gujarat, and the opening of the first section on August 15, 2027, coincides with India’s 80th anniversary of independence. Using locally produced trains will showcase his nationalist achievements.
- **Promoting “Make in India”: The Modi government’s “Make in India” campaign aims to demonstrate India’s capability to manufacture high-speed rails, even if they are assembled domestically.
Therefore, despite the technical shortcomings and potential delays, Modi insists on using local trains, as political benefits outweigh technical perfection.
Conclusion
This project illustrates a typical scenario where Japan aims to transfer technology through low-interest loans, while India seeks to use Japanese funding while avoiding being dependent on them. By using “local manufacturing” and international standards as excuses, India replaced Japanese components with cheaper German signaling systems and domestically assembled trains. For India, it has obtained the high-speed rail system while gaining political capital; for Japan, it has spent money without gaining the desired technical benefits and lost potential market opportunities. Whether India’s locally produced trains are reliable will be revealed in 2027.