Hello everyone, I'm your financial journalist and friend, an economist. Today's topic might seem a bit distant from the daily concerns of many ordinary people, but it's actually closely related to each of our job security and even the innovative vitality of society as a whole: Should the "tenure system" for university professors be changed? Should professors have a "guaranteed job?"
There's a lot of debate online: some say professors can't just sit back and do nothing and must be able to enter and leave the profession at will; others argue that with constant evaluations, where would they have the time for research?
However, simplifying this issue to just whether or not they should have a guaranteed job is too superficial. Today, I'll break down this in plain language, using an in-depth article by Professor Huang Futao from Hiroshima University to help you understand the economic logic and the human nature at play behind it.
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Summary of Key Points
The main argument of the article is that the tenure system is not just about giving professors a "get-out-of-jail-free card"; it's essentially a "risk distribution mechanism." Universities are places where knowledge is produced, and knowledge creation is full of uncertainties (what might be a valuable discovery today could be obsolete in ten years). If professors have to bear the risk of both research failure and potential job loss or salary cuts, they will naturally choose the safest path, not the most valuable one.
The real purpose of the tenure system is to provide professors with a relatively stable career outlook after a rigorous selection process, allowing them to take on challenging, time-consuming projects that could change the world. If this stability is removed and competition becomes a constant throughout their career, it may seem to increase vitality, but in reality, it could stifle true innovation.
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In-Depth Analysis: Five Dimensions to Understand the Logic Behind the Tenure System
1. Risks Cannot Be Accumulated Indefinitely: Why Do Professors Need a Sense of Security?
Let's use an analogy. Suppose you're the CEO of a startup. You not only have to worry about whether your product will sell (business risk) but also about whether your boss will fire you tomorrow (career risk). What would you do? You would likely focus on low-risk, high-reward projects that are sure to succeed, because failing in innovation would mean losing both your project and your job.
The same logic applies to academia:
- Knowledge Creation Risk: You spend 5 years researching a niche topic, but it might yield nothing.
- Career Survival Risk: If the university requires you to be evaluated every 3 years and you don't meet the standards, you could be dismissed.
When these two risks overlap, the rational choice for professors is to avoid risk. They tend to choose research areas that are easier to publish in, projects that are more likely to get funding, and studies that show quick results. This leads to a paradox: universities aim to encourage innovation through competition, but it results in "self-interested individuals" and "short-sighted academics."
The essence of the tenure system is to separate these risks. During the pre-tenure period, professors bear significant career risks; once they are granted tenure, the university takes on most of the risks, allowing them to focus on the risks associated with knowledge creation. Without this safety net, innovation becomes much harder.
2. Mismatch in Time Scale: Using Sprint Rules for a Marathon
Many debates focus on whether the evaluation criteria are scientific, such as whether only the number of papers counts. However, the article points out a more hidden issue: the evaluation cycle itself is incorrect. Scientific research, especially in basic and humanities fields, often requires a long period of accumulation:
- Experimental sciences might yield results in 3-5 years.
- Humanities might produce a significant work after 10 years.
- Some groundbreaking theories might not be recognized until 20 years later.
Yet, current evaluations are typically conducted every 3-5 years. This is like asking a tree planter to report on how tall the tree has grown every 3 years; if it doesn't reach the required height, the tree is cut down. As a result, no one wants to plant trees that take 20 years to mature; everyone prefers to grow fast-growing bamboo or sell saplings.
The evaluation system not only measures the past but also defines the future. When "3 years" becomes a rigid deadline, it becomes a "real time unit" for research activities. Professors inevitably adjust their research pace to fit this short cycle. A proper evaluation system should recognize that different fields require different times.
3. Competition Without an End: The Trap of "Involvement" in Academia
Academia used to be competitive, but there was a goal: once you passed the doctoral, postdoctoral, and pre-tenure stages and obtained tenure, your life was relatively stable. This structure of high risk in the early stages and high stability later on made it attractive for young people to enter the field.
However, many universities are now reformed to include regular evaluations even after tenure, with the possibility of dismissal. This means that competition has expanded from just getting the job to the entire career. For young scholars, this is a huge blow. They have to consider not only their academic aspirations but also practical life issues: "Can I roughly predict what my life will be like in 5 or 10 years?" If job security is completely stripped away, academia loses its appeal to top talents. People might think, "If I have to live in constant fear throughout my career, I might as well get a high salary in a company or join a more stable institution." The tenure system provides a sense of predictable stability, which is crucial for attracting long-term commitment to academia.
4. Don't Mistake "Check-ups" for "Sentences": Three Types of Evaluations Must Be Separated
The article makes a crucial distinction among three types of evaluations in universities, which are often confused:
1. Basic Performance Evaluation (Check-up): Do you teach diligently? Are you responsible for your students? Have you been inactive for a long time? These are essential checks.
2. Professional Development Evaluation (Consultation): Is your current research direction correct? What resources do you need? How can teaching be improved? These should be constructive and dialogical, aimed at helping you grow.
3. Job Stability Evaluation (Decision): Can you stay in this position? Will your salary or rank be reduced? These are the most severe and directly affect your job.
The current problem is that the third type of evaluation is expanding excessively, often overshadowing the other two. If professors know that every professional development conversation could lead to dismissal, all interactions become defensive. They avoid telling the truth, admitting failures, or discussing long-term plans, and instead focus on showing their achievements.
The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) emphasizes that evaluating performance should not be confused with reevaluating one's professional status. Evaluations after tenure should aim to help professors improve, not to prove their eligibility to stay.
5. Japan's Experience: Competition Needs Stability as a Foundation
Many think Japanese universities are stable, but Japan also underwent intense "corporatization reforms" that introduced competition and performance metrics. However, after more than 20 years, Japanese policies have started to adjust. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology recently stated that competitive funding is important, but it cannot replace stable funding for salaries and operations.
Why? Competitive funding is limited in time and purpose, suitable for short-term breakthroughs, but not for long-term discipline building and talent development. A laboratory needs stability to train students; a discipline needs stability to establish traditions; a university needs stability to make 10-year plans. Competition can drive resource allocation, but it cannot create stability itself. Japan's experience reminds us that university reforms often start with more competition, but when it becomes excessive, we must ask: "What must be maintained stable?" Without a stable foundation, competition only brings anxiety and short-sightedness.
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Journalist's Note: What Should We Really Be Wary Of?
After reading this article, my main takeaway is that universities need not more evaluations but better professional judgment. If the first reaction to any problems—lack of enthusiasm among professors, poor research, or neglected teaching—is to add more evaluation criteria, then universities become like assembly-line factories.
Truly excellent universities need the ability to wait:
- To wait for young scholars to grow.
- To wait for niche topics to show their value.
- To allow even a well-funded research effort to fail if it doesn't succeed.
This is not inefficiency; it's the cost of knowledge creation.
So, when it comes to the tenure system, we shouldn't ask whether professors should have a guaranteed job, but whether reducing job stability also reduces their ability to undertake long-term research. If the answer is yes, then reforms that make everyone busier and more anxious may not necessarily make universities better.
Implications for Everyone: Although we are not professors, this logic applies to all industries that require innovation and long-term investment, such as technology, art, and education. If organizations focus only on short-term KPIs and create anxiety through constant evaluation, what remains are people who are good at meeting the requirements, not those who create real value. Stability is the soil for creativity, whether in academia or in business.