Summary of Key Points
This article focuses on the investigation of Sky Workshop, a fund network under the company's umbrella, analyzing the sources and destinations of its funds. On one hand, local state-owned assets have made significant investments (accounting for 55% of the registered funds), while existing shareholders (such as Xiaomi) have withdrawn, and market-oriented funds are virtually absent (only accounting for 2%). On the other hand, there appear to be two channels for the flow of capital: The official channel involves 22 registered funds that are invested in companies within the Sky Workshop ecosystem, fulfilling local investment return requirements. The unofficial channel consists of seven unregistered SPVs (Special Purpose Vehicles) with a total of 3.5 billion yuan; the source of these funds is unclear, and their destinations remain unknown. The article raises several questions: What is the actual purpose of these unregistered funds? Are there any compliance risks? Does Sky Workshop seem to be leveraging hundreds of millions in funds, or does it actually face financial difficulties?
I. The Fund Portfolio of Sky Workshop: Official Figures vs. Unclear Accounts
There are varying estimates for the scale of Sky Workshop's fund portfolio—some claim it is 25.2 billion yuan, others 41.6 billion yuan, and Lei Ming himself mentioned 17.7 billion yuan. According to the official website of the China Asset Management Association (AMCA), only 22 funds are registered, but there are numerous unregistered entities, such as seven companies with the prefix “Bo.” These seven companies are suspicious: they have similar names, each with a capital amount of 500 million yuan, and they are all registered in Xiamen. The funds come directly from Sky Workshop's subsidiaries but have not been registered with the AMCA. By regulation, funds must be registered within 20 days after fundraising; however, these companies failed to do so. If they were ordinary companies, their operation model (with a uniform capital amount of 500 million yuan) would not be typical for such entities. It's like opening a bank account without notifying the regulatory authorities, with no one knowing where the money comes from or goes.
II. Sources of Funds: Local State-Owned Assets Take the Lead, Market-Oriented Institutions Hesitate to Invest
Among the 22 registered funds, local state-owned assets have contributed 13.8 billion yuan (55%), Sky Workshop itself has contributed 10.59 billion yuan (42%), and market-oriented third-party institutions have only contributed just over 400 million yuan (less than 2%).
There may be two reasons why market-oriented institutions are reluctant to invest: First, most of the projects are internally created by Sky Workshop (for example, companies spun off from its ODM team that reuse Sky Workshop's motors), making them seem like internal initiatives with limited potential. Second, the transparency of the fund network is very low; the whereabouts of the funds in the unregistered SPVs are completely unknown, posing high risks. Local state-owned assets are willing to invest mainly to boost local industries (requiring the funds to be invested in local companies), but market-oriented institutions prioritize profitability and safety.
III. Fund Flow: An Internal Cycle within the Ecosystem, with Unofficial Channels Being a “Black Box”
The official fund flow is relatively clear: the money has been invested in 64 companies, most of which were established between 2025 and 2026 and are located in cities where local state-owned assets are based (fulfilling investment return requirements). However, many of these companies are closely associated with Sky Workshop. For instance, Langyong Future was spun off from Sky Workshop's ODM team, Xirui Smart Bed uses Sky Workshop’s motors, and Suzhou Qidian Xingjie Technology’s beneficiary is Bai Meifang, a shareholder of Sky Workshop who also holds shares in 506 related companies. Even the same project may be funded by multiple funds, seemingly diversifying risks but potentially just shifting money internally.
IV. Potential Risks: Compliance and Transparency Issues with Unregistered SPVs
According to the “Regulations on the Supervision and Management of Private Investment Funds,” funds must be registered; otherwise, they lack information disclosure requirements, supervision by custodian banks, and review by investment committees. These unregistered SPVs are like “unreined horses”: if they are considered funds but not registered, they are in violation of regulations. If they are ordinary companies operating in a fund-like manner, investors (LPs) face difficulties in protecting their interests if issues arise (such as misappropriation of funds). More critically, if registered funds (including those from local state-owned assets) flow through these SPVs, local state-owned assets as LPs may not be able to track the full path of the money.
V. The Mystery of Sky Workshop’s Financial Situation: Contradictory Signals About Cash Shortages
Initially, reports suggested that Sky Workshop would run out of cash by 2025 and was relying on delayed payments to survive. However, it has managed to leverage hundreds of millions in funds and even contributed 3.5 billion yuan to set up SPVs. This is contradictory:
- On one hand, Sky Workshop spent 2.8 billion yuan to repurchase Xiaomi shares and had to buy back its old shares at a higher price due to a failed listing, indicating a significant cash need.
- On the other hand, it has established numerous funds using local state-owned assets to invest in its own ecosystem companies, which seems like using others’ money to support its own projects. But if it truly has sufficient funds, why would market-oriented institutions only be willing to invest 2%?
The conclusion is that Sky Workshop cannot rely solely on its own resources and thus needs the funding from local state-owned assets to fill the gap. As for the unregistered SPVs, it is unclear whether their purpose is to quickly support the ecosystem or merely to transfer funds around. The lack of transparency is undoubtedly the biggest risk.
This article does not provide definitive answers but raises important questions: Where has all this money gone? Is it compliant? Are the local state-owned assets’ investments safe? How tight is Sky Workshop’s financial situation? Only more information disclosure in the future will shed light on these issues.