Summary of Key Points
This report presents the latest predictions on China's population trends by Li Xunlei's team, which corrects previous model biases that overestimated birth rates and underestimated life expectancy. It uses a more scientific approach to analyze future population dynamics based on age-specific fertility and mortality rates, considering three scenarios: accelerated aging and an inevitable decline in total population. The report also offers suggestions for increasing fertility rates. Additionally, it notes that although the pace of urbanization is slowing, large cities continue to attract populations, and industrial development (such as manufacturing and the digital economy) drives population movement, potentially leading to a phase of "passive urbanization."
I. Why were previous population predictions inaccurate? The model needs an upgrade!
Previous forecasts predicted 8.9 million births in 2025, but the actual number was only 7.92 million—indicating that the model's assumptions about fertility intentions were too optimistic. The total population was also higher than expected due to longer lifespans of the elderly.
What changes has the new model made?
- Age-specific fertility rates: The number of women of childbearing age varies significantly across different age groups (for example, there are more women aged 35-49 than those aged 15-29). Calculating the average number of children per woman (total fertility rate) directly can be misleading; using age-specific rates provides more accurate results.
- Age-specific mortality rates: The new model takes into account changes in mortality rates, especially among older populations, to better predict total population and aging trends.
The new model is a closed loop: it uses the current age distribution of women of childbearing age and fertility rates to estimate future births, and then uses mortality rates to forecast population levels in each age group, allowing for long-term trend predictions.
II. Future population trends: "Bad news" and "slightly better news" under three scenarios
The report outlines three scenarios (pessimistic, neutral, and optimistic) and concludes that accelerated aging and a decline in total population are inevitable before 2050. The long-term outcome depends on whether fertility rates can increase:
- In all scenarios:
- The aging rate will reach 20% by 2030 and 29% by 2050 (similar to Japan's current level).
- The total population will fall below 1.4 billion in 2027, to less than 1.2 billion by 2050, and may range from 500 million to 400 million by 2100.
- Pessimistic scenario: Fertility rates continue to decline (0.87 by 2100, lower than Japan's current level), with fewer than 2 million births and an aging rate of 50%, resulting in a dependency ratio of 120 (100 workers supporting 120 elderly people and children).
- Neutral scenario: Fertility rates remain at 1.05, with fewer than 2 million births by 2100 and an aging rate of 41%, leading to a dependency ratio of 90.
- Optimistic scenario: Fertility rates rise above 1.3, with 7.9 million births in 2050 and 3.5 million in 2100; the aging rate drops to 32% (18 percentage points lower than the pessimistic scenario), but the dependency ratio is still high due to more children.
III. Effective ways to increase fertility rates
Low fertility rates are a consequence of economic development (higher urbanization and income levels lead to lower birth rates), but policies can help:
- Focus on rural areas and small towns: Rural fertility rates are 1.54, compared to 1.2 in cities, partly due to more two-child and three-child families. Issues such as high marriage costs (like dowries and housing) need to be addressed.
- Encourage having more children: China's women start having children at younger ages than Japan's, but the proportion of two-child and three-child families is much lower. Policies to support these families (e.g., tuition subsidies and childcare benefits) can be effective.
- Address gender imbalances: There was a surplus of males born between 2006-2010; in the next decade, they will enter marriage age. Lower-educated men and highly educated women face difficulties finding partners, which affects fertility rates.
IV. Population movement: Large cities are becoming increasingly crowded, and urbanization is changing
- Slowing urbanization: The urbanization rate will decrease from 1.34% to 0.8% annually, reaching around 70% by 2028, with many small and medium-sized cities experiencing population decline.
- Large cities remain attractive: Core cities in Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu (such as Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, and Nanjing) are growing rapidly. Provincial capitals have a strong demographic pull (e.g., Harbin's population is declining, but its capital city is still growing).
- Passive urbanization: Future urbanization will not be driven by farmers moving to cities; it will result from higher mortality rates in rural areas or administrative changes (e.g., merging counties into districts). This type of urbanization does not create new housing demand.
V. Industries drive population distribution
Population movement is influenced by industries:
- Manufacturing and exports: Regions with strong manufacturing and export sectors (like Dongguan and Foshan) see population inflows.
- Digital economy and high-end manufacturing: Zhejiang's e-commerce and cross-border trade provide flexible employment opportunities, while Jiangsu's advanced equipment and semiconductor industries attract skilled workers.
- Central and western cities: Cities like Chengdu, Wuhan, and Zhengzhou attract populations due to industrial development (e.g., electronics and new energy) and resources (coal, wind energy). Chongqing will see a net population inflow of 115,000 by 2025, ranking fourth in the country.
The overall trend is that populations will continue to concentrate in large cities and key industrial areas, with small and medium-sized cities possibly merging (similar to the consolidation of rural villages).
The core message of this report is that population issues are long-term challenges that require proactive planning (e.g., addressing social security gaps and infrastructure overcapacity). However, there's no need for excessive anxiety; the focus should be on developing models that adapt to these demographic changes.