Summary of Key Points
Juzi Biology initially gained momentum rapidly through its "micro-business agent proliferation" model with the Keli Jin brand. Later, it switched to the Kefu Mei brand to achieve high growth by leveraging the benefits of live-streaming e-commerce, and was once regarded as a star company in the "recombinant collagen industry." However, in the second half of 2025, both revenue and profit declined, revealing issues such as an aging brand (slow transformation of Keli Jin), dependence on channels (shift from micro-business to live-streaming e-commerce with diminishing traffic benefits), and insufficient investment in research and development (a disconnect between its technological narrative and actual spending). Its growth strategy has always relied on external channel advantages rather than the core competitiveness of its products.
I. The Micro-business Gene: Keli Jin's Rapid Rise and Historical Burden
Juzi Biology made its first fortune with the Keli Jin brand, primarily using a "agent proliferation" model:
- Simple and aggressive approach: Agents who paid 12,000 yuan could purchase products at a 65% discount and received a reward of 2,400 yuan for recommending new agents; sub-agents also earned commissions from sales. Agents acted as both sellers and buyers—reaching out to new agents meant additional orders for the company, which eliminated the need for advertising or setting up physical stores, shifting the burden of customer acquisition and inventory management onto them.
- Short-term success: In 2019, Keli Jin contributed 50% of the company's revenue, with Xi'an Chuangke Village (the agency platform) being its largest customer, accounting for 52% of sales. However, this model had drawbacks: agents' purchases did not necessarily translate into actual consumer sales, and the multi-level commission structure was criticized as resembling pyramid schemes.
- The Burden After Going Public: To comply with regulatory requirements, Juzi Biology had to disassociate itself from Chuangke Village and reduce its reliance on micro-business models. This once-motor of growth became a historical burden, and Keli Jin fell behind due to its continued dependence on old channels.
II. Channel Transition: Kefu Mei Takes Over, but the Old Brand Falls Behind
To move away from micro-business dependency, Juzi Biology shifted to direct online sales (live-streaming e-commerce), with Kefu Mei becoming the new growth driver:
- Dramatic change in channel structure: From 2019 to 2024, the proportion of distribution channels decreased from 80% to 25%, with direct online sales taking over. Kefu Mei capitalized on traffic from platforms like Tmall and Douyin, achieving revenue of 1.6 billion yuan in 2022 (a 79% increase), far exceeding Keli Jin's 620 million yuan (a 17% increase). In the first half of 2023, Kefu Mei's revenue doubled, while Keli Jin only increased by 6.6%.
- Reversal of Brand Dominance: In 2019, Keli Jin's revenue was twice that of Kefu Mei; by 2023, Kefu Mei had become the main contributor. However, Keli Jin failed to keep up with the transition—used to relying on agent referrals, it now faces higher costs and greater challenges in acquiring traffic from platforms like Douyin and小红shu and competing with international brands.
III. The Peak of Traffic Benefits: A Dilemma of Insufficient Growth Momentum
Kefu Mei's rapid growth depended on live-streaming e-commerce traffic, but this advantage peaked in 2025:
- Rising traffic costs: Fees for live-streaming slots and commissions for influencers have increased significantly, doubling the cost of acquiring customers.
- Keli Jin's Transformation Challenges: Juzi Biology attempted to reposition Keli Jin as a high-end anti-aging brand, but the profits once generated by agents now come from platform fees and marketing expenses. Additionally, consumers' negative perception of the brand as a micro-business product hinders its competitiveness against brands like Perleya and international competitors.
- Failure of Growth Strategies: Both the micro-business model and live-streaming investment relied on external benefits; with the decline in these sources, Juzi Biology is struggling to grow.
IV. Research and Development vs. Marketing: Imbalance in Investment
Juzi Biology has emphasized its "recombinant collagen technology" as a competitive advantage, but actual investment has fallen short:
- Decreased R&D spending: In 2025, R&D expenses were 89 million yuan (a 16% decrease year-on-year), with an expenditure ratio of only 1.3%, lower than Perleya's 2.05% and Shangmei Group's 2.45%. Despite claiming to be a "technology company," its R&D investment is less than that of purely marketing-driven beauty brands.
- Soaring Marketing Expenses: Marketing expenses increased from 31% in 2023 to 34% in 2025, with most funds going towards traffic acquisition and live-streaming activities. This indicates a growing reliance on external sources of growth rather than product innovation.
- Contradictions: Without a technological advantage, products that rely on traffic benefits struggle to retain customers. Juzi Biology's focus on technology has become a major obstacle to its growth.
Conclusion
Juzi Biology's story is a typical example of a company that thrived on external channel advantages. It successfully adapted to changes from micro-business to live-streaming e-commerce, but it never built strong product competitiveness. Now that both channels have reached their limits, the real test lies in whether consumers will continue to support its products without these external factors.