Summary of the Core Issues
Shenzhen Xiandinghui Company attracted hundreds of investors through a model that involved purchasing cooking robots and then renting them back with post-sale agreements, promising a return on investment in just 10 months (an annualized return of 120%). The company also made false claims about having a background as a listed company and numerous collaborating restaurants. However, the products were actually semi-automatic cooking pots, not true robots. Many of the partnering restaurants had closed or stopped using these devices, leading to a breakdown in the company's financial chain. In 2026, the company filed for bankruptcy, resulting in investors losing tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of yuan, with their principal amounts being virtually unrecoverable.
Detailed Analysis
The High-Return “Pie”: How the Post-Sale Rental Scheme Deceived Investors
Xiandinghui’s approach was straightforward: you would pay 21,800 yuan for a cooking robot, and the company would rent it back and claim to repay your initial investment within 10 months (equivalent to a monthly return of 2,180 yuan), while you could continue to earn profits. The annualized return rate seemed astonishing at 120%—by comparison, bank investments typically offer around 3%, and even high-risk stock funds rarely achieve such returns.
Su Xia was tempted by this promise. After purchasing one robot and receiving the promised monthly payments for the first few months, she bought three more, investing a total of 87,200 yuan. Before she could recoup her investment, the company began to default on its repayments, and she is still unable to recover more than 30,000 yuan.
This scheme is essentially a Ponzi scheme, where funds from later investors are used to pay returns to earlier ones. Once no new investments are made, the entire structure collapses.
The False Promises: The Listed Company Background and Collaborating Restaurants
To convince investors, Xiandinghui emphasized two key selling points:
- Listed Company Background: They claimed to be in partnership with a Hong Kong-listed company called China Art Finance, suggesting they were controlled by a listed entity. In reality, the joint venture’s registered capital was only 10,000 Hong Kong dollars (about 8,000 RMB), with China Art Finance contributing just 5,100 Hong Kong dollars (a 51% stake). There was no further activity from this joint venture, meaning they had merely used the name of a listed company to deceive investors.
- Collaborating Restaurants: They showed investors restaurants in Guangzhou that were using their robots. However, upon investigation, it was found that these restaurants had either closed or been sold, and those still in operation claimed the robots were actually just semi-automatic devices that required manual operation.
How Investors Got Trapped
Xiandinghui’s marketing strategy exploited psychological factors:
- Initial Success: They started by offering small returns to attract investors. After seeing initial profits, more people were encouraged to invest.
- City Partnership Network: They recruited “city partners” who sold the robots and brought in additional investors, with the partners earning commissions. This network quickly spread across the country, drawing hundreds of investors into the scheme.
- Secretive about the Robots: Many investors never saw the robots they purchased; the company claimed they had been rented out, but without providing any details about the tenants or usage locations. Investors were solely focused on their repayments and ignored the authenticity of the products.
Signs of the Company’s Collapse
The breakdown in Xiandinghui’s financial health was gradual:
- Employee Payroll Issues: Starting in 2024, employees began to receive delayed salaries and their social security benefits were interrupted, indicating cash flow problems.
- Partners noticing Problems: City partners noticed that orders for robots were not being fulfilled, and even the rented robots were difficult to collect payments from.
- Legal Troubles: The company faced multiple lawsuits over contract disputes in 2025. In May 2026, it was listed as a “judicially enforceable debtor,” and by July, bankruptcy proceedings were initiated, leaving investors with little hope of getting their money back.
Where Did the Money Go?
There are two possible explanations for the disappearance of the investors’ funds:
- Company Expenses: The company claimed the money was used for preparing for an IPO, but this seems unlikely for a company selling cooking robots.
- Employee Misappropriation: Some employees speculated that the company sold its shares to raise funds. Given the false promotions, it’s more likely that the money was misused by the company’s management.
The company’s owner, Tian Rui, is still active in the investors’ WeChat groups but refuses to respond to any requests for refunds, showing a clear attempt to evade responsibility.
A Lesson for Everyone
This case highlights a common scam: investments that promise high returns with no risk or guaranteed profits are often fraudulent. An annualized return of 120% is almost unheard of, even in the stock market. When encountering schemes involving buying products and then renting them back or using a referral system to earn commissions, it’s essential to question everything:
- Is the product really worth that much?
- Who is renting the products, and where are they being used?
- Are there any signs of actual business operations?
Don’t let the promise of quick profits fool you—otherwise, you could end up losing all your money.