Summary of Key Points
Since the U.S. launched its war against Iran in February 2026, Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, which is a vital passage for over one-third of global oil shipments. Gulf countries have considered building alternative pipelines to bypass this route, but experts argue that these solutions do not address the root issue: the crisis stems from regional political and security tensions, not merely transportation problems. Alternative pipelines have significant flaws in terms of export security, cost, market competitiveness, and stability. Ultimately, a lasting solution requires rebuilding a consensus on security with Iran.
1. Alternative Pipelines Are a Band-Aid, Not a Cure: The Root of the Crisis Lies in Security Disputes with Iran
Many believe that building additional pipelines will solve the problem of the Strait of Hormuz, but the real issue is not whether such pipelines exist, but whether Iran allows their use. As long as relations between Iran and Gulf countries (such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE) remain strained, Iran could easily target any pipeline or port at any time—after all, Iran is a neighboring country with missile capabilities that cover the entire Gulf region. For example, the UAE’s export port of Fujairah is within Iran’s range of attack, but it remains safe only due to a private agreement with Iran. In essence, closing the Strait of Hormuz is just one of Iran’s strategic tools; the real issue is the breakdown in security cooperation between the two parties. Without resolving this, Iran could find other ways to create obstacles (such as blowing up pipelines or blocking new ports), leading to ongoing problems.
2. Alternative Pipeline Exports Are Either Blocked by Iran or Subject to Additional Costs
Gulf countries have primarily considered two routes for their alternative pipelines:
1. Red Sea/Mediterranean Route: For instance, the Saudi East-West Pipeline transports oil to the port of Yanbu in the Red Sea. However, to sell oil to Asian markets (such as China and India), ships must pass through the Strait of Mandeb, which is controlled by Houthi rebels (allies of Iran) and could be blocked at any time.
2. African Bypass Route: If the Strait of Mandeb is also closed, ships would have to navigate through the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean Sea, and around the Cape of Good Hope into the Indian Ocean, adding an additional month to the journey and incurring significantly higher costs. The fuel expenses alone for a single oil tanker, plus the Suez Canal fee, amount to $2.6 million—more than Iran’s highest “toll” of $2 million. Moreover, in July 2026, when tensions between the U.S. and Iran escalated, Suez Canal fees increased by 12%, further increasing the cost for Gulf countries.
Therefore, alternative pipeline exports are either at risk of being blocked by Iran or Houthi rebels or are prohibitively expensive, making them no viable solution to the security issue.
3. Buyers Cannot Wait; Middle Eastern Oil May Be Replaced by Other Producing Countries
Building pipelines takes time; the earliest they could be operational is in 2028. Asian buyers (such as China, Japan, and South Korea) cannot afford to wait for two years and will likely turn to other sources of oil, such as Brazil, Venezuela, and West Africa (Nigeria, Angola). The reason Middle Eastern oil was once popular in Asia was its proximity, which reduced transportation costs and delivery times. However, with the new routes, the distance from Middle East to Asia has increased. For example, West African crude oil of higher quality was previously heavily imported by the U.S., and now Asian buyers may switch to these sources. Once these new suppliers establish long-term partnerships, Middle Eastern oil’s market advantage in Asia will be lost, making it difficult for the region to regain its dominance.
4. Pipelines Are More Vulnerable Than the Strait of Hormuz: They Are Both Expensive to Build and Difficult to Protect
Pipelines may seem like stable infrastructure, but they are actually less secure than the Strait of Hormuz:
1. Cross-border Pipelines Are Prone to Damage: For example, two pipelines in Iraq have been largely abandoned due to their location through conflict zones (Iraq and Syria), where they have been bombed by militants or seized by various factions, resulting in intermittent disruptions in supply. Even the Saudi East-West Pipeline, although within Saudi territory, could be attacked if tensions with Houthi rebels escalate, as Yanbu Port handles 75% of Saudi exports.
2. Lack of Funding and Investment: Building pipelines and supporting ports requires billions of dollars, and international investors are wary of the risks associated with conflict zones. Countries along the Caspian Sea (such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) have pipelines but have struggled to increase exports due to security concerns. If Gulf countries rely on alternative pipelines, they may end up in a similar situation.
Conclusion
Alternative pipelines represent a misplaced solution; they treat the Strait of Hormuz crisis as a transportation issue when it is actually a political and security one. Instead of spending billions on ineffective pipelines, it would be better to pursue reconciliation with Iran. Only by rebuilding a consensus on security can the threat posed by the Strait of Hormuz be eliminated, and all related transportation issues will be resolved. Otherwise, building more pipelines will be utterly futile.